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TRANSFER OF VENUE IN INCOME TAX PROSECUTIONS:
18 U.S.C. § 3237(b)'s USE OF THE MAILS
REQUIREMENT
INTRODUCTION
Section 3237(a)' of the federal "continuing offense" statute2 allows the
government broad discretion in establishing venue in criminal prosecu-
tions.3 Certain income tax violations, however, are not subject to this
discretion.4 In a prosecution for any of these offenses, section 3237(b)5
gives the defendant the option to transfer venue from the government's
chosen forum to the forum in which he was residing at the time of the
alleged violation.6 The purview of subsection (b)7 includes tax evasion,8
fraud,9 perjury' ° and the improper disposal or withholding of property or
records regarding tax liability." Subject to one exception not relevant
1. 18 U.S.C. § 3237(a) (1982).
2. See United States v. Clemente, 608 F.2d 76, 82 (2d Cir. 1979) (Kearse, J., dissent-
ing) (§ 3237 is commonly referred to as the "continuing offense" statute), cert denied,
446 U.S. 908 (1980); United States v. Bozza, 365 F.2d 206, 220 (2d Cir. 1966) (same);
Travis v. United States, 247 F.2d 130, 133 (10th Cir. 1957) (same).
3. See United States v. Gillette, 189 F.2d 449, 452 (2d Cir.), cert denied, 342 U.S.
827 (1951). Section 3237(a) provides that crimes committed in more than one district, or
begun and completed in different districts, may be prosecuted "in any district in which
such offense was begun, continued, or completed." 18 U.S.C. § 3237(a) (1982). Offenses
involving use of the mails or transportation in interstate or foreign commerce may be
prosecuted "in any district from, through, or into which such commerce or mail matter
moves." Id.
4. See United States v. Youse, 387 F. Supp. 132, 134 (E.D. Wis. 1975).
5. 18 U.S.C. § 3237(b) (1982).
6. Id.; see United States v. Scott, 472 F. Supp. 1073, 1075 (N.D. 111. 1979), aff'd
mem., 618 F.2d 109 (7th Cir. 1980); United States v. Ostrer, 458 F. Supp. 540, 541
(S.D.N.Y. 1978); United States v. Rosenstein, 303 F. Supp. 210, 212 (S.D.N.Y. 1969).
Section 3237(b) provides:
Notwithstanding subsection (a), where an offense is described in section 7203
of the Internal Revenue Code of 1954, or where an offense involves use of the
mails and is an offense described in section 7201 or 7206(1), (2), or (5) of such
Code (whether or not the offense is also described in another provision of the
law), and prosecution is begun in a judicial district other than the judicial dis-
trict in which the defendant resides, he may upon motion filed in the district in
which the prosecution is begun, elect to be tried in the district in which he was
residing at the time the alleged offense was committed: Provided, That the mo-
tion is filed within twenty days after arraignment of the defendant upon indict-
ment or information.
18 U.S.C. § 3237(b) (1982) (emphasis in original). If at the time of the prosecution the
defendant has established a residence in the government's chosen forum, he may not
transfer venue to the district in which he was residing at the time of the alleged offense.
See United States v. Rosenstein, 303 F. Supp. 210, 212 (S.D.N.Y. 1969).
7. See 18 U.S.C. § 3237(b) (1982).
8. See I.R.C. § 7201 (1982) (attempting to evade or defeat tax).
9. See id. § 7206(2) (aiding or assisting in producing false or fraudulent statement).
10. See id. § 7206(1) (using false statement in declaration made under penalty of
perjury).
11. See id. § 7206(5) (in a compromise decision with IRS, concealing property or
withholding, concealing, or destroying records regarding tax liability).
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here,12 application of subsection (b) requires that the predicate tax of-
fense "involv[e] use of the mails."'" Therefore, absent some use of the
mails in the commission of the alleged violation, the defendant may not
obtain a transfer of venue pursuant to section 3237(b).14
For example, assume defendants A and B commit tax fraud with re-
spect to the subleasing of coal fields located in district 1. Defendants A
and B reside in districts 2 and 3 respectively. Upon discovering the
fraud, the government initiates a single prosecution against both defend-
ants in district 1. In response, A and B, invoking section 3237(b), move
to sever the prosecution and transfer venue to districts 2 and 3.
The success or failure of defendants' motions would depend largely on
the jurisdiction in which the case was being heard. A majority of courts
would grant the transfers of venue, 5 thus compelling the government to
12. See id. § 7203. This offense, the willful failure to file a return, supply information,
or pay tax, id., is expressly exempted from § 3237(b)'s use of the mails requirement. See
18 U.S.C. § 3237(b) (1982). It was not originally included among that statute's predicate
offenses. See Act of Aug. 6, 1958, Pub. L. No. 85-595, 72 Stat. 512 (codified as amended
at 18 U.S.C. § 3237(b) (1982)). Section 3237(b) was amended in 1966 to include this
offense within its purview. Act of Nov. 2, 1966, Pub. L. No. 89-713, § 2, 80 Stat. 1107,
1108 (codified as amended at 18 U.S.C. § 3237(b) (1982)). The analysis of this Note will
be limited to those predicate offenses subject to the mailing requirement.
13. 18 U.S.C. § 3237(b) (1982); see In re United States, 706 F.2d 494, 496 (4th Cir.),
cert. denied, 104 S. Ct. 496 (1983); United States v. United States Dist. Court, 693 F.2d
68, 69 (9th Cir. 1982) (per curiam); United States v. DeMarco, 394 F. Supp. 611, 613
(D.D.C. 1975).
14. See United States v. DeMarco, 394 F. Supp. 611, 613 (D.D.C. 1975). A defend-
ant who cannot gain a transfer of venue under § 3237(b) may move for a transfer pursu-
ant to Rule 21(b) of the Federal Rules of Criminal Procedure. See United States v.
Hurwitz, 573 F. Supp. 547, 551-52 (S.D. W. Va. 1983); United States v. Scott, 472 F.
Supp. 1073, 1075 n.2 (N.D. Ill. 1979), affid mem., 618 F.2d 109 (7th Cir. 1980); Fed. R.
Crim. P. 21(b). Rule 21(b) provides: "For the convenience of parties and witnesses, and
in the interest of justice, the court upon motion of the defendant may transfer the pro-
ceeding as to him or any one or more of the counts thereof to another district." Id. The
Treasury and Justice Departments opposed enactment of § 3237(b), arguing that it was
unnecessary in light of Rule 21(b)'s transfer of venue provisions. See S. Rep. No. 1952,
85th Cong., 2d Sess. 3, 6 [hereinafter cited as S. Rep. No. 1952], reprinted in 1958 U.S.
Code Cong. & Ad. News 3261, 3263, 3265. Despite these objections, § 3237(b) was en-
acted. See Act of Aug. 6, 1958, Pub. L. No. 85-595, 72 Stat. 512 (codified as amended at
18 U.S.C. § 3237(b) (1982)). Unlike Rule 21(b), which allows transfers at the court's
discretion, see United States v*,Garza, 664 F.2d 135, 139 (7th Cir. 1981), cert. denied, 455
U.S. 993 (1982), § 3237(b), when its statutory requirements are fulfilled, provides for
transfers of venue as an absolute right, see United States v. Youse, 387 F. Supp. 132, 134
(E.D. Wis. 1975). Furthermore, § 3237(b) requires a transfer to the defendant's home
district. See 18 U.S.C. §3237(b) (1982). In comparison, Rule 21(b) allows the court to
choose the new venue, see United States v. Marcello, 280 F. Supp. 510, 520 (E.D. La.
1968), affid, 423 F.2d 993 (5th Cir.), cert. denied, 398 U.S. 959 (1970); Fed. R. Crim. P.
21(b), and the defendant has no right to demand that venue be transferred to any particu-
lar forum, see Marcello, 280 F. Supp. at 520.
15. See United States v. United States Dist. Court, 693 F.2d 68, 70-71 (9th Cir. 1982)
(per curiam); United States v. DeMarco, 394 F. Supp. 611, 614-15 (D.D.C. 1975); United
States v. Youse, 387 F. Supp. 132, 134-35 (E.D. Wis. 1975); United States v. Dalitz, 248
F. Supp. 238, 239-40 (S.D. Cal. 1965).
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carry out two separate but substantially similar prosecutions.1 6 A minor-
ity of courts, however, would deny the motions and oblige the defendants
to face a single prosecution in the original forum, district 1.17
The significant difference between the majority and minority analyses
of section 3237(b) ultimately arises from their respective interpretations
of the statute's use of the mails requirement.1 8 The majority view main-
tains that any use of the mails during the course of the predicate offense
will support the application of section 3237(b). 19 This includes, for ex-
ample, such insubstantial uses as communication with others regarding
the preparation and filing of tax returns.2' In the hypothetical example,
therefore, any correspondence by mail between individuals A and B in
regard to their tax fraud would satisfy the use of the mails requirement
under the majority view.
In contrast, the minority analysis maintains far stricter criteria for the
fulfillment of section 3237(b)'s use of the mails requirement: The statute
can be applied only in those cases in which the defendant's use of the
mails constitutes the prosecution's sole basis for establishing venue.2 1
Consequently, a defendant's motion for transfer would be granted only
when his offense has no contact with the original forum other than that
16. See, e.g., United States v. United States Dist. Court, 693 F.2d 68, 70 (9th Cir.
1982) (per curiam); United States v. DeMarco, 394 F. Supp. 611, 618 (D.D.C. 1975);
United States v. Youse, 387 F. Supp. 132, 135 (E.D. Wis. 1975).
17. See In re United States, 706 F.2d 494, 496 (4th Cir.), cert. denied, 104 S. Ct. 496
(1983); United States v. Clemente, 608 F.2d 76, 80-81 (2d Cir. 1979), cert. denied, 446
U.S. 908 (1980); United States v. Dorison, 573 F. Supp. 809, 811 (S.D. W. Va.), appeal
denied, 723 F.2d 903 (4th Cir. 1983), cert denied, 104 S. Ct. 2346 (1984); see also United
States v. Hurwitz, 573 F. Supp. 547, 550 n.10 (S.D. W. Va. 1983) (subscribing to minority
view in dictum); United States v. Posner, 549 F. Supp. 475, 476 n.1 (S.D.N.Y. 1982)
(same). The minority analysis has been adopted by the Second and Fourth Circuits. Two
earlier Second Circuit cases, however, indicate a prior tacit approval of the majority in-
terpretation of § 3237(b). See United States v. Slutsky, 487 F.2d 832, 839 n.9 (2d Cir.
1973), cert. denied, 416 U.S. 937 (1974); United States v. Gross, 276 F.2d 816, 820 (2d
Cir.), cert. denied, 363 U.S. 831 (1960). In United States v. Clemente, 608 F.2d 76 (2d
Cir. 1979), cert. denied, 446 U.S. 908 (1980), however, the court stated that those prior
decisions had not expressly addressed the meaning of § 3237(b)'s use of the mails require-
ment and therefore did not operate to limit the court's consideration of that issue. See id.
at 78 n.3.
18. See United States v. Clemente, 608 F.2d 76, 78-79 (2d Cir. 1979), cert. denied, 446
U.S. 908 (1980).
19. See United States v. United States Dist. Court, 693 F.2d 68, 70-71 (9th Cir. 1982)
(per curiam) (adopting broad interpretation of § 3237(b)'s use of the mails requirement);
United States v. DeMarco, 394 F. Supp. 611, 614-15 (D.D.C. 1975) (same); United States
v. Youse, 387 F. Supp. 132, 134-35 (E.D. Wis. 1975) (use of the mails requirement not
limited to mailing returns for filing); United States v. Dalitz, 248 F. Supp. 238, 239-40
(S.D. Cal. 1965) (uncontroverted affidavit alleging that defendant filed his return by mail
fulfilled § 3237(b)'s mailing requirement).
20. See United States v. Youse, 387 F. Supp. 132, 134 (E.D. Wis. 1975).
21. See In re United States, 706 F.2d 494, 496 (4th Cir.), cert. denied, 104 S. Ct. 496
(1983); United States v. Clemente, 608 F.2d 76, 81 (2d Cir. 1979), cert. denied, 446 U.S.
908 (1980); United States v. Dorison, 573 F. Supp. 809, 811 (S.D. W. Va.), appeal denied,
723 F.2d 903 (4th Cir. 1983), cert. denied, 104 S. Ct. 2346 (1984).
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gained through a use of the mails.22 In the hypothetical example, the
presence of the subject of the fraud-coal fields-in district 1 would jus-
tify the government's choice of venue and preclude defendants' motions
to transfer.
This Note contends that courts should apply the minority view of sec-
tion 3237(b), tempered by a minimum contacts analysis. Part I analyzes
the language and legislative history of section 3237(b) and concludes that
both support the minority view. Part II examines the consequences of
the majority and minority approaches to section 3237(b) transfer motions
in view of Congress' dual interest in protecting the convenience of de-
fendants and attaining judicial and administrative economy. In an effort
to reconcile these disparate interests, this Note concludes that a defend-
ant should be granted a transfer of venue only when his contact with the
government's chosen forum is based entirely on his use of the mails or on
otherwise negligible connections.
I. STATUTORY LANGUAGE AND LEGISLATIVE HISTORY
OF SECTION 3237(b)
A. Language
The phrase "involves use of the mails" is dispositive of the question
whether a defendant may successfully invoke section 3237(b)'s transfer of
venue provision;2 3 however, it is not defined in the statute.24 Although it
has been averred that this language is unambiguous, 25 the phrase sup-
ports at least two possible interpretations of the degree of mail use neces-
sary to satisfy that threshold requirement.26 Most broadly, the phrase
could be construed to encompass any use of the mails by the defendant in
the course of committing one of the predicate offenses.27 Under this
view, which has been adopted by a majority of courts, any use, however
insubstantial, entitles a defendant to invoke his statutory right to transfer
venue. 28 A more narrow reading similarly requires some use of the mails
22. See In re United States, 706 F.2d 494, 496 (4th Cir.), cert. denied, 104 S. Ct. 496
(1983); United States v. Clemente, 608 F.2d 76, 80-81 (2d Cir. 1979), cert. denied, 446
U.S. 908 (1980); United States v. Dorison, 573 F. Supp. 809, 811 (S.D. W. Va.), appeal
denied, 723 F.2d 903 (4th Cir. 1983), cert. denied, 104 S. Ct. 2346 (1984).
23. See United States v. DeMarco, 394 F. Supp. 611, 613 (D.D.C. 1975).
24. See 18 U.S.C. § 3237(b) (1982).
25. See United States v. Clemente, 608 F.2d 76, 82 (2d Cir. 1979) (Kearse, J., dissent-
ing), cert. denied, 446 U.S. 908 (1980); United States v. DeMarco, 394 F. Supp. 611, 616
(D.D.C. 1975); see also United States v. United States Dist. Court, 693 F.2d 68, 70-71
(9th Cir. 1982) (per curiam) (holding based on "plain meaning" of statute).
26. See United States v. Clemente, 608 F.2d 76, 79 (2d Cir. 1979), cert. denied, 446
U.S. 908 (1980). The court in Clemente, in fact, posited three possible interpretations of
the phrase "involves use of the mails." See id. One interpretation-that a use of the
mails must be an element of the crime charged, id.-has not, however, been adopted by
any jurisdiction.
27. Id.
28. See United States v. United States Dist. Court, 693 F.2d 68, 69-70 (9th Cir. 1982)
(per curiam); United States v. DeMarco, 394 F. Supp. 611, 614-17 (D.D.C. 1975); United
[Vol. 53
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for the provision to be applicable,29 but would deny transfer unless that
use is shown to be the sole basis on which the government establishes
venue.30 The statutory language, however, "does not unambiguously re-
quire any one of these. . interpretations. '31
Of these interpretations, only the minority view finds support in the
standard procedures used to interpret ambiguous statutory provisos.32
When the language of such a statutory exception is sufficiently ambigu-
ous to generate several conflicting interpretations,33 the rules of statutory
construction suggest that the most narrow interpretation should be ap-
plied.34 This rule provides as a matter of policy that only those parties
expressly exempted by the proviso should be removed from the statute's
ambit.35 Underlying this policy is the belief that the modified statute in
fact manifests the legislature's general intent.36 Section 3237(b), by al-
lowing certain defendants to temper the broad prosecutorial venue-set-
ting powers conferred by section 3237(a), operates as such an exception
and should therefore be construed narrowly.
The dispute over the interpretation of section 3237(b) precludes the
blind adoption of the statutory language's supposed plain meaning.
Therefore, to understand the meaning of section 3237(b)'s use of the
mails requirement, it is necessary to examine that statute's legislative
history.37
States v. Youse, 387 F. Supp. 132, 134-35 (E.D. Wis. 1975); United States v. Dalitz, 248
F. Supp 238, 239-40 (S.D. Cal. 1965); United States v. Kimble, 186 F. Supp. 616, 617
(S.D.N.Y. 1960); see also United States v. Turkish, 458 F. Supp. 874, 877 n.5 (S.D.N.Y.
1978) (presumes offense involves sufficient use of mails to satisfy §3237(b) requirement),
aff'd on other grounds, 623 F.2d 769 (2d Cir. 1980), cert. denied, 449 U.S. 1077 (1981).
29. United States v. Clemente, 608 F.2d 76, 79 (2d Cir. 1979), cert. denied, 446 U.S.
908 (1980).
30. See, eg., In re United States, 706 F.2d 494, 496 (4th Cir.), cert. denied, 104 S. Ct.
496 (1983); United States v. Dorison, 573 F. Supp. 809, 811 (S.D. W. Va.), appeal denied,
723 F.2d 903 (4th Cir. 1983), cert. denied, 104 S. Ct. 2346 (1984); see also United States v.
Clemente, 608 F.2d 76, 81 (2d Cir. 1979) ("The statute does not enable a taxpayer who
has violated the law in a district by means other than use of the mails to escape prosecu-
tion in that district simply by mailing a letter."), cert. denied, 446 U.S. 908 (1980).
31. United States v. Clemente, 608 F.2d 76, 79 (2d Cir. 1979), cert. denied, 446 U.S.
908 (1980).
32. See 2A N. Singer, Sutherland Statutory Construction § 47.08, at 135 (C. Sands
rev. 4th ed. 1984) (statutory provisos "serve the purpose of restricting the operative effect
of statutory language to less than what its scope of operation would be otherwise"); see
also 1A C. Sands, Sutherland Statutory Construction § 20.22, at 75 (4th ed. 1972) (sav-
ings clauses, exceptions and provisos are all strictly interpreted).
33. See United States v. Clemente, 608 F.2d 76, 79 (2d Cir. 1979) (noting § 3237(b)'s
ambiguity), cert. denied, 446 U.S. 908 (1980). See also supra notes 27-31 (discussing
alternative interpretations of § 3237(b)).
34. See 2A N. Singer, supra note 32, § 47.08, at 135.
35. See it
36. See iL
37. See id § 45.05, at 20-21.
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B. Legislative History of Section 3237(b)
1. Meaning of Use of the Mails
The legislative history of section 3237(b) clearly indicates that the de-
fendant's use of the mails in the course of committing the predicate of-
fense would not by itself be sufficient to satisfy the mailing requirement.38
In hearings before the House Judiciary Subcommittee, Representative
Prince Preston, section 3237(b)'s sponsor, testified that his proposed bill
would apply only to those situations in which a mailing was an essential
element of the predicate offense.39 Preston stated: "The bill would not
cover situations where the use of the mails is not an ingredient of the
offense charged."'  Accordingly, in the opinion of the bill's sponsor, not
38. See United States v. Clemente, 608 F.2d 76, 79-81 (2d Cir. 1979), cert. denied, 446
U.S. 908 (1980); Hearings on H.R. 8252 Before Subcomm. No. 4 of the House Comm. on
the Judiciary, 85th Cong., 2d Sess. 6 (1958) (unpublished) (available in files of Fordham
Law Review) (hereinafter cited as Hearings]; see also In re United States, 706 F.2d 494,
496 (4th Cir.) (minority view faithful to congressional intent), cert. denied, 104 S. Ct. 496
(1983).
39. See United States v. Clemente, 608 F.2d 76, 79 (2d Cir. 1979), cert. denied, 446
U.S. 908 (1980); Hearings, supra note 38, at 6 (statement of Rep. Preston).
40. Hearings, supra note 38, at 6; see United States v. Clemente, 608 F.2d 76, 80 (2d
Cir. 1979) ("There is no indication that Congress intended to give a taxpayer the option
to be tried in his district of residence when it is his criminal conduct and not the use of
the mails that the Government relies upon to establish venue elsewhere."), cert. denied,
446 U.S. 908 (1980). During the course of debate, however, one Congressman opined
that a use of the mails need not be an element of the predicate offense. See Hearings,
supra note 38, at 8 (statement of Rep. Dowdy); see also Clemente, 608 F.2d at 85 (Kearse,
J., dissenting) (legislative history favors broad view). It has been suggested that Preston's
statement was applicable to an early draft of § 3237(b) rather than the version actually
enacted. See id. at 84-85 (Kearse, J., dissenting). The first draft of § 3237(b), if enacted,
would have compelled the government to initiate prosecutions in the district in which the
defendant was residing at the time of the alleged offense. See H.R. 8252, 85th Cong., 2d
Sess., 104 Cong. Rec. 13,064 (1958). That Version of the statute, however, involved
problems of unconstitutionality. See United States v. Scott, 472 F. Supp. 1073, 1078
(N.D. Ill. 1979), affid mem., 618 F.2d 109 (7th Cir. 1980); see also U.S. Const. art. III,
§ 2, cl. 3 ("[tjhe trial of all Crimes. . .shall be held in the State where the said Crimes
shall have been committed"); id. amend. VI (defendant has right to speedy, public trials
with impartial jury "of the State and district wherein the crime shall have been commit-
ted"). These problems were resolved by redrafting the statute so that the defendant him-
self would be obliged to move for transfer in order to take advantage of the transfer of
venue provision. Compare H.R. 8252, 85th Cong., 2d Sess., 104 Cong. Rec. 13,064
(1958) (original version) with 18 U.S.C. § 3237(b) (1982) (amended version as codified).
Thus, it might be said that by invoking the statute's transfer privileges, the defendant has
waived his constitutional right to a trial in the district in which the crime occurred. See
Scott, 472 F. Supp. at 1078. Even if the immediate purpose of Preston's statement was to
indicate the constitutionality of the first version of the bill, his statement clearly indicates
his belief that § 3237(b) would not apply to all offenses involving a use of the mails. See
Clemente, 608 F.2d at 79 n.5. The provision at issue-"involves use of the mails"-is
identical in both versions of the bill. See 104 Cong. Rec. 13,064 (1958) (citing text of
both amended and original versions of H.R. 8252). Representative Preston's statements
regarding an earlier version of the bill are certainly probative of the meaning of the lan-
guage in the enacted statute. See 2A N. Singer, supra note 32, § 51.04 (statute need not
be valid or existing to lend guidance in interpretation of another ambiguous statute).
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all uses of the mails would fulfill section 3237(b)'s mailing requirement.4'
2. Legislative Purpose
The particular problem Preston contemplated in proposing section
3237(b) involved the government's use of section 3237(a) to set venue for
tax prosecutions in districts far distant from the defendants' homes.42
Preston's congressional district was located in the Southern District of
Georgia.4 3 His constituents, however, were obliged to mail their tax re-
turns to the Internal Revenue Service (IRS) center in the Northern Dis-
trict of that state.' By invoking the broad venue provisions of section
3237(a), the government would often pursue tax prosecutions in the
Northern District even though the defendants resided and had prepared
their returns hundreds of miles away.45
As a result, Preston's constituents were required to face prosecutions
in a district with which they had no contacts other than those gained
through the mailing of their tax returns.41 By allowing defendants to
transfer the venue of these tax prosecutions to the district in which they
resided at the time of the offense, Congress sought to protect the defend-
ant from prosecution in a distant forum.47
At the same time, Congress expressed its belief that the implementa-
tion of section 3237(b) would result in "inconsequential," if any, addi-
tional costs to the government." It contemplated that the venue
established as a result of a section 3237(b) motion would encompass the
situs of the offense,4 9 thus sparing both the defendant and the govern-
ment the inconvenience and expense of transporting witnesses and evi-
dence to a distant forum."0 Thus, any interpretation of section 3237(b)
should reconcile Congress' intent to protect the defendant's interest in a
convenient forum and its desire to avoid significantly increased govern-
mental costs.
II. POLICY CONSIDERATIONS
A. Criticism of the Majority View
The majority view, by liberally granting venue transfers, promotes the
41. See United States v. Clemente, 608 F.2d 76, 79 n.5 (2d Cir. 1979), cer, denied,
446 U.S. 908 (1980).
42. See id. at 79; Hearings, supra note 38, at 7, 10-12 (defendants required to stand
trial in Atlanta, 285 miles from their homes in Savannah).
43. See Hearings, supra note 38, at 7, 10-12.
44. See id.
45. See id.
46. See id
47. See S. Rep. No. 1952, supra note 14, at 2, reprinted in 1958 U.S. Code Cong. &
Ad. News at 3262.
48. Id., reprinted in 1958 U.S. Code Cong. & Ad. News at 3262.
49. See id., reprinted in 1958 U.S. Code Cong. & Ad. News at 3262; H.R. Rep. No.
1890, 85th Cong., 2d Sess. 2 (1958).
50. See H.&. Rep. No. 1890, 85th Cong., 2d Sess. 2 (1958).
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defendant's convenience interests, but fails entirely to recognize Con-
gress' corresponding desire to limit governmental expenditures." Conse-
quently, courts adopting this view have applied section 3237(b) to
situations that are clearly beyond the contemplation of Congress. 2 The
majority's broad reading of section 3237(b) allows transfers of venue
when defendant's convenience is not even at issue." In fact, that con-
struction, by escalating government costs and facilitating delay5 4 without
direct benefit to the defendant, makes it possible for a defendant to con-
travene the intent of Congress.55
For example, the majority interpretation of section 3237(b) has al-
lowed transfer of venue between two districts that were equally accessible
to the defendant.5 6 In such a situation, the defendant's position is not
materially improved by his use of section 3237(b),17 yet the government
is nevertheless compelled to suffer the expense and inconvenience of
transferring its prosecution.5" Similarly, broad application of section
3237(b) enables a defendant to transfer venue when his only purpose is to
delay trial. Because the satisfaction of section 3237(b)'s statutory re-
quirements confers a statutory right not subject to the court's discre-
51. See United States v. Clemente, 608 F.2d 76, 80 (2d Cir. 1979), cert. denied, 446
U.S. 908 (1980); see also United States v. United States Dist. Court, 693 F.2d 68, 70 (9th
Cir. 1982) (per curiam) (court conceded defects in majority view but adopted it).
52. See United States v. Clemente, 608 F.2d 76, 78, 79 (2d Cir. 1979) (identifying
courts adhering to majority view and criticizing their disregard of congressional intent),
cert. denied, 446 U.S. 908 (1980).
53. Yee, eg., United States v. Kimble, 186 F. Supp. 616, 616-17 (S.D.N.Y. 1960)
(transfer between geographically close regions of Manhattan and Brooklyn); United
States v. Wortman, 26 F.R.D. 183, 191-93 (E.D. Ill. 1960) (transfer from East St. Louis
to St. Louis), rev'd on other grounds, 326 F.2d 717 (7th Cir. 1964).
54. See United States v. Wortman, 26 F.R.D. 183, 192 (E.D. 111. 1960), rev'd on other
grounds, 326 F.2d 717 (7th Cir. 1964). In Wortman, the distance between the defendant's
home and the original forum was approximately nine miles. Id. After the transfer of
venue, the distance between the defendant's residence and the court house was approxi-
mately 100 miles. Id. Although the defendant's action did not further Congress' intent to
protect the convenience of the defendant, the Wortman court nevertheless allowed the
transfer of venue. See id. Although the defendant arguably derives indirect benefit by
delaying final resolution of the dispute, it is unlikely that Congress intended to promote
defendant's convenience in this way.
55. See In re United States, 706 F.2d 494, 496 (4th Cir.), cert. denied, 104 S. Ct. 496
(1983); see also United States v. United States Dist. Court, 693 F.2d 68, 70 (9th Cir.
1982) (per curiam) (noting problems with majority view); United States v. Clemente, 608
F.2d 76, 86 (2d Cir. 1979) (Kearse, J., dissenting) (same), cert. denied, 446 U.S. 908
(1980).
56. See United States v. Kimble, 186 F. Supp. 616, 617 (S.D.N.Y. 1960); United
States v. Wortman, 26 F.R.D. 183, 192 (E.D. Ill. 1960), rev'd on other grounds, 326 F.2d
717 (7th Cir. 1964); see also United States v. Clemente, 608 F.2d 76, 86 (2d Cir. 1979)
(Kearse, J., dissenting) (analyzing Kimble and Wortman), cert. denied, 446 U.S. 908
(1980).
57. See United States v. Wortman, 26 F.R.D. 183, 192 (E.D. I1. 1960), rev'd on other
grounds, 326 F.2d 717 (7th Cir. 1964); see also United States v. Clemente, 608 F.2d 76, 86
(2d Cir. 1979) (Kearse, J., dissenting) (noting that some transfers cause inconvenience to
defendant), cert. denied, 446 U.S. 908 (1980).
58. See supra note 54 and accompanying text.
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tion, 9 a court adhering to the broad view must grant the motion even
when the desired transfer in no way serves the defendant's or his wit-
nesses' geographic convenience.' Applied in this manner, the majority
view of section 3237(b) unjustifiably depletes governmental and judicial
resources, 61 a situation hardly foreseen or approved by Congress. 62
These additional costs may prove to be significant.63 This is best illus-
trated by defendants' use of section 3237(b) to generate multiple, sub-
stantially similar prosecutions." Under the majority view, each
defendant in a case involving several defendants would be entitled to a
transfer to his own home district even if the defendants were all involved
in criminal activity in the government's chosen forum.6 The impact of
such transfers on the government would necessarily be far from "incon-
sequential., 6 6 Ironically, in ordering that a joint prosecution be severed
in precisely this way, one court conceded:
There is much to be said for the government's position [urging the
adoption of the minority view]. It does not appear that the sponsors of
59. See United States v. Youse, 387 F. Supp. 132, 134 (E.D. Wis. 1975); United States
v. Wortman, 26 F.R.D. 183, 192 (E.D. Ill. 1960), rev'd on other grounds, 326 F.2d 717
(7th Cir. 1964); S. Rep. No. 1952, supra note 14, at 2, reprinted in 1958 U.S. Code Cong.
& Ad. News at 3262. Before a defendant may invoke § 3237(b)'s mandatory transfer
provision, he must fulfill that statute's express requirements. See United States v.
DeMarco, 394 F. Supp. 611, 613 (D.D.C. 1975) (listing prerequisites to application of
§ 3237(b)). The scope of this Note is limited to an examination of the criteria needed to
satisfy the use of the mails requirement.
60. See United States v. Wortman, 26 F.R.D. 183, 192 (F-D. Ill. 1960), rev'd on other
grounds, 326 F.2d 717 (7th Cir. 1964).
61. See In re United States, 706 F.2d 494, 496 (4th Cir.) (minority view "avoids the
judicial inefficiency and duplicative proceedings that would be the inevitable result of a
broader interpretation of that language"), cert. denied, 104 S. Ct. 496 (1983). In an at-
tempt to avoid the wasteful consequences of the majority view, the government has been
prompted to take extreme measures. In one case, the government commenced a prosecu-
tion against two defendants in the District of Columbia. See United States v. DeMarco,
401 F. Supp. 505, 507 (C.D. Cal. 1975), affid on other grounds, 550 F.2d 1224 (9th Cir.),
cert. denied, 434 U.S. 827 (1977). Both defendants moved to transfer venue to their re-
spective home courts in Chicago and Los Angeles. Id. at 508. In response, the govern-
ment threatened to add new charges to the original indictment in order to dissuade the
defendants from persisting in their motions. Id. Noting a "'potential for vindictive-
ness,'" however, the court thwarted the government's efforts. Id. at 507 (citing
Blackledge v. Perry, 417 U.S. 21, 28 (1974)).
62. See United States v. Clemente, 608 F.2d 76, 80 (2d Cir. 1979), cert. denied, 446
U.S. 908 (1980).
63. United States v. United States Dist. Court, 693 F.2d 68, 70 (9th Cir. 1982) (per
curiam).
64. See id.; United States v. Clemente, 608 F.2d 76, 80 (2d Cir. 1979), cert. denied,
446 U.S. 908 (1980); United States v. DeMarco, 401 F. Supp. 505, 507-08 (C.D. Cal.
1975), affid on other grounds, 550 F.2d 1224 (9th Cir.), cert. denied, 434 U.S. 827 (1977).
65. United States v. United States Dist. Court, 693 F.2d 68, 69-70 (9th Cir. 1982) (per
curiam).
66. See S. Rep. No. 1952, supra note 14, at 2, reprinted in 1958 U.S. Code Cong. &
Ad. News at 3262 (Congress' view that any costs involved in enacting § 3237(b) would be
"inconsequential"); see, e.g., In re United States, 706 F.2d 494, 496 (4th Cir.), cert. de-
nied, 104 S. Ct. 496 (1983); United States v. United States Dist. Court, 693 F.2d 68, 70
(9th Cir. 1982) (per curiam); United States v. Clemente, 608 F.2d 76, 80 (2d Cir. 1979),
cert. denied, 446 U.S. 908 (1980).
1985]
FORDHAM LAW REVIEW
H.R. 8252 [enacted as section 3237(b)] actually considered the type of
situation presented in this case when the statute was drafted. . . . Ap-
plication of the law to this case. . . would require the government to
conduct two lengthy and similar trials at considerable expense and in-
convenience. One of these trials would be in a remote district with
no connection with the crime except for the fortuity of the defendants'
residence there.
67
Under the minority analysis, the problem of duplicative prosecutions
will generally not arise.6" Unless use of the mails was the defendants' sole
connection to the original forum and, as such, constituted the govern-
ment's exclusive basis for jurisdiction under section 3237(a), motions by
multiple defendants for severance and transfer would be denied.69 In
other words, proof of some "nonmail" connection or contact with the
original forum will support the government's choice of venue and will
preclude operation of section 3237(b)." This will enable the government
to conduct a single unified prosecution against multiple defendants for
offenses arising out of a common nucleus of facts. 1
B. Criticism of the Minority View
Although there is firm support in the legislative history for the adop-
tion of the minority view, 72 that view fails fully to realize congressional
intent.7 3 As a result of its parsimonious application of section 3237(b)'s
transfer of venue provision, this view promotes administrative efficiency
and judicial economy at the expense of the interests and convenience of
67. United States v. United States Dist. Court, 693 F.2d 68, 70 (9th Cir. 1982) (per
curiam).
68. See In re United States, 706 F.2d 494, 496 (4th Cir.) (denies transfer because it
would produce two substantially similar trials), cert. denied, 104 S. Ct. 496 (1983); see
also United States v. United States Dist. Court, 693 F.2d 68, 69-70 (9th Cir. 1982) (per
curiam) (conceding possibility of duplicative prosecutions under majority view); United
States v. Clemente, 608 F.2d 76, 80 (2d Cir. 1979) (denies transfer, noting dangers of
duplicative prosecutions under majority view), cert. denied, 446 U.S. 908 (1980).
69. See United States v. Dorison, 573 F. Supp. 809, 811 (S.D. W. Va.), appeal denied,
723 F.2d 903 (4th Cir. 1983), cert. denied, 104 S. Ct. 2346 (1984). By denying transfer,
the government maintained a single prosecution in the Southern District of West Vir-
ginia. If the Dorison court had adopted the majority view, three separate but substan-
tially similar prosecutions would have been pursued in New Jersey, New York and
Florida. See id. at 810; see also In re United States, 706 F.2d 494, 496 (4th Cir.) (main-
taining unified prosecution by denying motion for transfer), cert. denied, 104 S. Ct. 496
(1983).
70. See United States v. Dorison, 573 F. Supp. 809, 811 (S.D. W. Va.), appeal denied,
723 F.2d 903 (4th Cir. 1983), cert. denied, 104 S. Ct. 2346 (1984).
71. See In re United States, 706 F.2d 494, 495-96 (4th Cir.), cert. denied, 104 S. Ct.
496 (1983); United States v. Dorison, 573 F. Supp. 809, 810, 811 (S.D. W. Va.), appeal
denied, 723 F.2d 903 (4th Cir. 1983), cert. denied, 104 S. Ct. 2346 (1984).
72. See supra notes 3841 and accompanying text.
73. See United States v. United States Dist. Court, 693 F.2d 68, 69-70 (9th Cir. 1982)
(per curiam); United States v. Clemente, 608 F.2d 76, 83-84 (2d Cir. 1979) (Kearse, J.,
dissenting), cert. denied, 446 U.S. 908 (1980).
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the defendant.74 Where the majority view would impose more than "in-
consequential" costs on the government,7' the minority view would ig-
nore Congress' equally clear belief that the government can expect to
sustain some inconvenience and expense to preserve the defendant's right
to transfer venue.76 Just as it would be contrary to the spirit of the statute
to allow section 3237(b) to be used for obstructive purposes by sophisti-
cated defendants,7 so it would also be unfair to force defendants to stand
trial far from home because of insubstantial contacts with the govern-
ment's chosen forum.7" The minority analysis should therefore be tem-
pered to promote fairness and protect the convenience of the defendant
without unduly taxing administrative and judicial resources.
C. The Alternative: Implementing a Minimum Contacts Standard
1. Balancing Interests
Under both the majority and minority views, a defendant is entitled to
a transfer of venue pursuant to section 3237(b) when a use of the mails is
his sole connection with the government's chosen forum.79 The two
views diverge, however, when the defendant's offense has some contact
with the original venue beyond those gained through a use of the mails.
This additional contact would not prevent a transfer under the majority
view, but under the minority analysis, any connection with the original
forum not based on a mailing would preclude the application of section
3237(b). 81
74. See United States v. United States Dist. Court, 693 F.2d 68, 70 (9th Cir. 1982)
(per curiam). In establishing the minority analysis, the court in United States v. Cle-
mente, 608 F.2d 76 (2d Cir. 1979), cert. denied, 446 U.S. 908 (1980), did not treat the
defendant unfairly. Clemente's contact with the government's chosen forum was sub-
stantial. See id. at 78 (fraudulent tax returns prepared in Southern District of New York,
the government's chosen forum). Furthermore, the defendant's home and the original
venue were geographically close. See id. at 77 (defendant's residence located in Eastern
District of New York). There is no guarantee, however, that future cases would reach
equally fair results. A possible example of a less significant contact precluding the appli-
cation of § 3237(b) may be found in United States v. Hurwitz, 573 F. Supp. 547 (S.D. W.
Va. 1983). In that case, defendant's agent visited an airport in the forum in order to
make a payment on a coal sublease. Id. at 550. That contact denied the defendant, a
New York resident, access to § 3237(b). See id. at 548, 550 & n.10.
75. See supra note 66 and accompanying text.
76. In protecting the defendant's convenience, it may be necessary to increase govern-
mental expenditures. See United States v. United States Dist. Court, 693 F.2d 68, 70 (9th
Cir. 1982) (per curiam).
77. See United States v. Wortman, 26 F.RLD. 183, 192 (E.D. Il. 1960) (defendant
used § 3237(b) for unarticulated purposes other than promoting his own convenience),
rev'd on other grounds, 326 F.2d 717 (7th Cir. 1964).
78. See S. Rep. No. 1952, supra note 14, at 2, reprinted in 1958 U.S. Code Cong. &
Ad. News at 3262. In enacting § 3237(b), Congress sought to spare the defendant the cost
and inconvenience of facing a prosecution in a distant forum. See id., reprinted in U.S.
Code Cong. & Ad. News at 3262.
79. See supra notes 15, 17.
80. See supra note 15.
81. See In re United States, 706 F.2d 494, 496 (4th Cir.), cert. denied, 104 S. Ct. 496
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Those courts adopting the minority view have failed to specify what
type of contact would be significant enough to deny the defendant access
to section 3237(b).8 2 Negligible contacts with a forum constitute a suffi-
cient basis for the government to establish venue under section 3237(a).8 3
However, a defendant should not be required to face a tax prosecution in
a given forum merely because of an inconsequential contact if section
3237(b) would permit a transfer in the absence of that contact.84 Con-
gress intended section 3237(b) to protect the convenience of defendants
by limiting the purview of section 3237(a).85 To be fairly denied a trans-
fer of venue, therefore, defendants' connections with the government's
chosen forum must be substantial.
Section 3237(b) was designed to achieve the dual goal of preserving the
defendant's interests while simultaneously conserving the government's
resources.8 6 When the defendant has a significant contact 87 with the
original forum, both goals are realized.88 Because the defendant has in-
tentionally developed a substantial association with the forum, it is fair to
require him to stand trial there.8 9 Economy would also be served insofar
(1983); United States v. Clemente, 608 F.2d 76, 80-81 (2d Cir. 1979), cert. denied, 446
U.S. 908 (1980). Under this view, transfer of venue will be granted only when the use of
the mails is the sole nexus between the offense and the government's chosen forum.
United States v. Dorison, 573 F. Supp. 809, 811 (S.D. W. Va.), appeal denied, 723 F.2d
903 (4th Cir. 1983), cert. denied, 104 S. Ct. 2346 (1984).
82. Although the denial of transfer in In re United States and Clemente would not
have been unfair because of the substantiality of the defendants' contacts with the govern-
ment's chosen forum, see infra note 87, the courts there declined to offer a rule explicitly
identifying the type of contact that would be sufficient to deny a transfer of venue. See In
re United States, 706 F.2d 494, 496 (4th Cir.), cert. denied, 104 S. Ct. 496 (1983); United
States v. Clemente, 608 F.2d 76, 81 (2d Cir. 1979), cert. denied, 446 U.S. 908 (1980).
83. For example, merely passing through a district in the course of committing a
crime may constitute a sufficient basis under § 3237(a) for establishing venue there. See,
e.g., Clinton v. United States, 293 F.2d 47, 47-48 (10th Cir. 1961) (kidnapping); Reed
Enters. v. Clark, 278 F. Supp. 372, 374 (D.D.C. 1967) (mailing pornography), aff'd per
curiam, 390 U.S. 457 (1968); United States v. Duma, 228 F. Supp. 755, 756 (S.D.N.Y.
1964) (committing mail fraud).
84. See S. Rep. No. 1952, supra note 14, at 2 (purpose of § 3237(b) was to relieve
defendants of burden of facing trial in unfamiliar fora), reprinted in 1958 U.S. Code
Cong. & Ad. News at 3262.
85. See id., reprinted in 1958 U.S. Code Cong. & Ad. News at 3262.
86. See id at 1-2, reprinted in 1958 U.S. Code Cong. & Ad News at 3262. Although
expressing a desire to protect the convenience of the defendant, Congress did not antici-
pate that it would require significant expenditures to achieve that end. See id., reprinted
in 1958 U.S. Code Cong. & Ad. News at 3262.
87. A significant contact might be one integrally connected with the predicate offense.
For example, the preparation of the tax returns in the government's chosen forum would
have been a sufficiently significant contact in United States v. Clemente, 608 F.2d 76 (2d
Cir. 1979), cert. denied, 446 U.S. 908 (1980), to have warranted denial of transfer. Id. at
77-78.
88. See infra notes 89, 90 and accompanying text.
89. In limiting the states' jurisdiction over nonresident defendants, the Supreme
Court sought, in part, to protect the convenience of the defendant. See World-Wide
Volkswagen Corp. v. Woodson, 444 U.S. 286, 292 (1980); see also In re United States,
706 F.2d 494, 496 (4th Cir.) ("If Nardone [the defendant, a New York resident] is incon-
venienced by a trial in the Southern District of West Virginia, it is only because he chose
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as evidence of activity relating to the offense-and witnesses with knowl-
edge of that activity-would probably be found in that district."°
If the defendant's contacts with the original forum are merely negligi-
ble,91 however, it would defy congressional purpose to require prosecu-
tion there.92 Arguably, denying a section 3237(b) transfer in that
situation would still inure to the government's economic advantage,93
but, it would in effect completely disregard Congress' desire to protect
the convenience of the defendant.94 It would be unfair to require a de-
fendant to face a prosecution in a distant district.9" Similarly, witnesses
would be compelled to travel to and testify in the government's chosen
forum, even though their testimony relates to facts and events occurring
in other districts.96 Thus, to fulfill the dual purposes underlying section
3237(b), defendants with merely negligible contacts with the original
venue should be allowed access to the transfer of venue provisions.
Under both the majority and minority views, if the defendant has no
contact with the forum other than a use of the mails, he may transfer
venue pursuant to section 3237(b).97 A similar result would be reached
to go into that district to accomplish his allegedly fraudulent scheme."), cert. denied, 104
S. Ct 496 (1983).
90. See United States v. United States Dist. Court, 693 F.2d 68, 69 (9th Cir. 1982)
(per curiam) (virtually all of the defendants' criminal activity occurred in government's
chosen forum); United States v. Scott, 472 F. Supp. 1073, 1077 (N.D. IlL 1979) (witnesses
and records located in government's chosen forum), aff'd mem., 618 F.2d 109 (7th Cir.
1980).
91. A negligible contact might be one involving only tangential connection to the
predicate offense. A contact of short duration might also be considered negligible. See,
eg., Corley v. Milliken, 633 F.2d 1135, 1136-37 (5th Cir. 1981); Rollins Nursing Home,
Inc. v. M & LC/Stillwell Mortgage Co., 267 Ark. 369, 370, 379, 593 S.W.2d 1, 2, 7
(1979); Floyd J. Harkness Co. v. Haberman, 60 Cal. App. 3d 696, 698, 131 Cal. Rptr.
672, 673 (1976).
92. See United States v. United States Dist. Court, 693 F.2d 68, 69 (9th Cir. 1982)
(per curiam) (original goal of § 3237(b) was to spare defendant burden of facing trial in
unfamiliar district); United States v. Clemente, 608 F.2d 76, 83 (2d Cir. 1979) (Kearse, J.,
dissenting) (same), cert denied, 446 U.S. 908 (1980).
93. By establishing venue on the basis of negligible contacts, the government might,
for example, seek to find a common forum in which several defendants could be jointly
tried. Presumably, the prosecution would set venue in such a district only when doing so
would confer an economic or tactical advantage on the government. For illustrations of
fora chosen by the government on the basis of minor contacts, see supra note 83.
94. See supra note 84.
95. See United States v. DeMarco, 394 F. Supp. 611, 617 (D.D.C. 1975).
96. See United States v. United States Dist. Court, 693 F.2d 68, 69-70 (9th Cir. 1982)
(per curiam). In this case, although almost all of the criminal activity connected with the
predicate offense took place in or around San Diego, venue was nevertheless transferred
over 450 miles to San Francisco. See id.; see also In re United States, 706 F.2d 494, 496
(4th Cir. 1983) (expressing concern for witnesses' convenience), cert. denied, 104 S. Ct.
496 (1983).
97. See In re United States, 706 F.2d 494, 496 (4th Cir.) (minority view), cert. denied,
104 S. Ct. 496 (1983); United States v. United States Dist Court, 693 F.2d 68, 69 (9th
Cir. 1982) (per curiam) (majority view); United States v. Clemente, 608 F.2d 76, 80-81
(2d Cir. 1979) (minority view), cert. denied, 446 U.S. 908 (1980); United States v.
Dorison, 573 F. Supp. 809, 811 (S.D. W. Va.) (same), appeal denied, 723 F.2d 903 (4th
Cir. 1983), cert. denied, 104 S. Ct. 2346 (1984).
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under the proposed analysis. Under the minority view, both significant
and insubstantial contacts could potentially preclude application of sec-
tion 3237(b).98 The proposed approach, on the other hand, would allow
transfer of venue if the defendant's connections with the forum were
merely negligible. Under the majority analysis, a defendant may transfer
venue regardless of the extent or nature of his contacts with the govern-
ment's chosen forum.9 9 Under the proposed view, however, a defendant
could not transfer venue from a forum with which he has significant
contacts.
2. Establishing the Criteria
In determining whether a contact is significant enough to preclude a
transfer of venue, a court might consider such factors as the typelX° and
duration'0 1 of the contact and its connection to the predicate offense., 2
A court might also consider the inconvenience to the defendant1 13 and
the danger of duplicative prosecutions. 10 All these factors should be
weighed in forging an equitable result." 5 To achieve this end, an analy-
sis similar to that used in limiting states' in personam jurisdiction over
nonresident defendants should be used.
Since its decision in Pennoyer v. Neff,'" 6 the Supreme Court has
adopted in succession several different criteria regarding the minimum
contacts necessary for the exercise of in personam jurisdiction. 0 7 In In-
98. See supra note 22.
99. See United States v. United States Dist. Court, 693 F.2d 68, 69, 70 (9th Cir. 1982)
(transfer granted although criminal activity occurred in government's chosen forum).
100. Cf International Shoe Co. v. Washington, 326 U.S. 310, 320 (1945) (generally
discussing nature of contact that would justify forum state's exercise of in personam
jurisdiction).
101. Cf Corley v. Milliken, 633 F.2d 1135, 1136-37 (5th Cir. 1981) (transitory contact
inadequate basis for jurisdiction); Corcoran v. Corcoran, 353 So. 2d 805, 809 (Ala, Civ.
App. 1978) (residing briefly in jurisdiction did not confer jurisdiction); Floyd J. Harkness
Co. v. Haberman, 60 Cal. App. 3d 696, 698, 131 Cal. Rptr. 672, 673 (1976) (defendant
briefly in forum).
102. See United States v. Dorison, 573 F. Supp. 809, 811 (S.D. W. Va.) (discussing
nexus between forum and defendant's misdeed), appeal denied, 723 F.2d 903 (4th Cir.
1983), cerL denied, 104 S. Ct. 2346 (1984); cf Blum v. Morgan Guar. Trust Co., 539
F.2d 1388, 1391 (5th Cir. 1976) (discussing nexus between offense and purported basis for
personal jurisdiction).
103. Cf World-Wide Volkswagen Corp. v. Woodson, 444 U.S. 286, 292 (1980) (mini-
mum contacts analysis protects defendant against "burdens of litigating in a distant or
inconvenient forum"); Kulko v. Superior Court, 436 U.S. 84, 97 (1978) (discussing bur-
dens imposed on defendant by litigating in distant forum).
104. -Cf World-Wide Volkswagen Corp. v. Woodson, 444 U.S. 286, 292 (1980) ("ob-
taining the most efficient resolution of controversies" is factor in minimum contacts
analysis).
105. Cf World-Wide Volkswagen Corp. v. Woodson, 444 U.S. 286, 292 (1980) (con-
flicting interests weighed in minimum contacts analysis); Kulko v. Superior Court, 436
U.S. 84, 92 (1980) (same); International Shoe Co. v. Washington, 326 U.S. 310, 317-18
(1945) (same).
106. 95 U.S. 714 (1878).
107. In Pennoyer, the Supreme Court held that a court's power of in personam juris-
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ternational Shoe Co. v. Washington,10 8 the Supreme Court asserted that
"'traditional notions of fair play and substantial justice' "1 must be sat-
isfied before a defendant can be compelled to face trial in the forum
state. 110 Congress' goal in enacting section 3237(b) embodies similar
concerns of convenience and fairness to the defendant."I This minimum
contacts standard might therefore provide some guidance to a court in
analyzing the application of section 3237(b).l"
A minimum contacts analysis would attempt to reconcile the conflict-
ing interests inherent in a transfer of venue pursuant to section
3237(b). 13 A defendant would not be compelled to stand trial in a fo-
rum in which he has negligible contacts or none at all." 4 For example, if
the negligible contact was a mere passing of an item in interstate com-
merce through that district, venue could be set there pursuant to section
3237(a). 1 5 The minimum contacts analysis, however, would allow the
defendant to transfer venue to his home forum." 6 Under this view, the
government would still be able to bring unified prosecutions against de-
fendants who have availed themselves of the benefits of the government's
chosen forum." 7 Moreover, the convenience of witnesses would be
served because the government could bring prosecutions in the forum in
which the criminal activity occurred."' Thus, witnesses would be spared
diction did not extend beyond the forum's boundaries. See Pennoyer v. Neff, 95 U.S. 714,
722 (1878). In International Shoe, the Court limited the exercise of jurisdiction to those
instances where it would be fair and just to bring the defendant into the forum. See
International Shoe Co. v. Washington, 326 U.S. 310, 316 (1945). More recently, the
Court has asserted that the defendant must purposefully avail himself of the benefits of
the forum before jurisdiction may be exercised. See Hanson v. Denckla, 357 U.S. 235,
253 (1958).
108. 326 U.S. 310 (1945).
109. Id. at 316 (quoting Milliken v. Meyer, 311 U.S. 457, 463 (1940)).
110. See id.
111. See S. Rep. No. 1952, supra note 14, at 2, reprinted in 1958 U.S. Code Cong. &
Ad. News at 3262.
112. Both the minimum contacts analysis, see Kulko v. Superior Court, 436 U.S. 84,
97 (1978), and § 3237(b), see S. Rep. No. 1952, supra note 14, at 2, reprinted in 1958 U.S.
Code Cong. & Ad. News at 3262, share a common goal of protecting the convenience of
the defendanL
113. Cf. Kulko v. Superior Court, 436 U.S. 84, 92 (1978) (conflicting interests must be
weighed in minimum contacts analysis); Varsic v. United States Dist. Court, 607 F.2d
245, 249 (9th Cir. 1979) (quoting Kulko v. Superior Court, 436 U.S. 84, 92 (1978)). In a
transfer pursuant to § 3237(b), the defendant seeks to protect his own convenience. See
United States v. United States Dist. Court, 693 F.2d 68, 70 (9th Cir. 1982) (per curiam).
See supra note 84 and accompanying text. For the sake of efficiency, however, the prose-
cution will seek to limit the applicability of § 3237(b). See United States v. Clemente,
608 F.2d 76, 80 (2d Cir. 1979), cerL denied, 446 U.S. 908 (1980).
114. Cf. Hanson v. Denckla, 357 U.S. 235, 251 (1958) (jurisdiction denied because of
insufficient contacts between defendant and forum).
115. See supra note 83.
116. Cf Hanson v. Denckla, 357 U.S. 235, 251 (1958) (defendant may not be haled
into court in jurisdiction with which he has merely negligible contacts).
117. See In re United States, 706 F.2d 494, 496 (4th Cir.), cert. denied, 104 S. Ct. 496
(1983).
118. See supra note 90.
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the inconvenience of testifying at a trial in the defendant's home district
when their testimony relates to activities occurring in the government's
chosen forum.' 19
Accordingly, the application of a minimum contacts analysis would
make it possible to protect the convenience of the defendant while also
conserving the government's limited prosecutorial resources.
CONCLUSION
Section 3237(b) was designed to give the defendants in certain income
tax prosecutions the opportunity to transfer venue from the govern-
ment's chosen forum to their respective home districts. Such transfer,
however, is limited to those instances in which the tax violation involves
a use of the mails. The better of the two current interpretations of this
statutory requirement maintains that a defendant may invoke section
3237(b) only when such use of the mails was the government's sole basis
for establishing the original venue. This view would preclude transfer
when the defendant's offense has some contact with the government's
chosen forum other than those gained through a use of the mails.
The use of a minimum contacts analysis, however, would allow de-
fendants access to section 3237(b) when their connections with the origi-
nal forum are not based solely on mere use of the mails but are
nonetheless negligible. Congress' purposes in enacting section 3237(b)-
protecting the interests of defendants while limiting government expendi-
tures-would thus be realized.
Michael R. Isby
119. See United States v. United States Dist. Court, 693 F.2d 68, 69, 70 (9th Cir. 1982)
(per curiam). The court's adoption of the majority analysis resulted in a trial being held
hundreds of miles from the actual situs of the offense. See id. at 70.
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